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WE NEED TO CHANGEIdeas of Growth and Development in a Time of Crisis of Fossil Energy 
and Capitalism 
Mladen Domazet 
Group 22, Zagreb
' e purpose of this paper is to lay the groundwork, and provoke others to dig it up, for the holistic 
understanding of the economic hopes and geophysical drivers behind the themes of green economy and 
degrowth. It " rst " ghts for the voice in which to frame the warning of global civilizational collapse, its 
physical and historic drivers and experiential instantiations. ' e paper surveys the opinions of scholars 
from environmental science, biology, history, le( ist social theory and economics addressing the notion 
that the global civilisation as we know it is facing a collapse of human societies and practices sustaining 
it1. Whilst there are historical narratives that evoke hope for a technological overcoming of this 
problem, in the text I endeavour to show how such a gamble is based on ontological confusion about the 
fundamental elements of the modern developmental success. ' e paper elucidates how the key collapse-
mitigating model is not a ma) er of small life-style changes reliant on technological transcence of physical 
constraints, but a ma) er of serious social restructuring that would replace the missing technological 
" x. But for that to become democratically acceptable, the societies must renegotiate the indicators and 
de" nitions of what wellbeing consists in, whlist humanity must rede" ne what its endurance is to consist 
of, not hope for the miracle of green economy. 
Key words: development, political economy, climate change, nature, civilisation, capitalism
Of late years a determined a& empt has been made to rewrite history in economic terms. 
But this does not go deep enough. Man’s thought and social life are built on his economic 
life; but this, in its turn, rests on biological foundations. Climate and geology between them 
decide where the raw materials of human industry are to be found, where manufactures 
can be established; and climate decides where the main springs of human energy shall be 
released. Changes of climate cause migrations, and migrations bring about not only wars, 
but the fertilizing intermingling of ideas necessary for rapid advance of civilization. 
(Huxley 1953: 61)
[Critical rationalism owes its inspiration] to the entire Enlightenment ambition to cre-
ate a historically grounded human science which would one day lead to the creation of 
a universal civilisation capable of making all individuals independent, autonomous, freed 
from above and below, self-knowing, and dependent solely on each other for survival. […] 
Much of what modern civilization has achieved we obviously owe to many factors, from 
increased medical knowledge to information technologies to vastly improved methods of 
transport, which although they are indirect legacy of the Enlightenment, and the revolu-
tions in science and technology which both preceded and followed it, have no immediate 
or direct connection to its ideals. But our ability even to frame our understanding of the 
world in terms of something larger than our own small patch of ground, our own culture, 
family, or religion clearly does.
(Pagden 2013: 315, 350-351) 
1 About Group 22 see more at: h& p://www.grupa22.hr/pocetna/about-us/.D
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Introduction 
Finding a voice in a text of this kind is a problem not only of academic abstraction but also 
a diagrammatic illustration of the nature obstacles before analysis and strategies addressing 
global civilizational collapse under transgression of limits to growth. Whilst the exploration 
and connecting of the topics is o+ en solitary, as there is no established discipline in which to 
couch most of the discursive word-games and ' nd a community, the analysis of causes and 
exploration of mitigation and adaptation strategies necessarily concerns a ‘we’ of ‘developed’ 
societies or even the entire human population. And then within the grand ‘we’ there are nec-
essarily divisions into those who debate, those who pollute, those who bene' t, those who 
su) er, those who will su) er, and those who read this etc. Now add a layer of shi+ ing time-
scales to all that, from timescales of geological forces to timescales of individual lives against 
which analyses and strategies are made meaningful. 
In explaining the reasons why this might be a special time for the whole human popula-
tion alive and the cultural edi' ce it accumulated, the narrative must draw on large scales of 
geological and biological evolution, development history, but also on the everyday scale of 
the political and economic struggles within lives of the author and the readers (you and I). If 
you think that nothing meaningful can be said about ‘tea’ as a drink I had this morning and 
the important commodity in pre-industrial trade within the same text, then read no more. 
For this is a text with exactly that task, to show how both the individual experience and the 
grand historical narratives weave an important meaningful whole to understand something 
about our common future (again, mine and yours). / is lengthy introduction serves to warn 
of the limitations of language, traditionally disciplinarily partitioned, especially in academia, 
to address a real and present danger. It relies on an optimistic hope of linguistic adaptability 
in achieving understanding between humans, whilst dismissing simplistic hopes of ‘greening’ 
of economic growth and ‘technological ' x’ of the physical constraints of the capitalist growth 
model. If you are still reading this, then you understand what I have said thus far; and so on… 
In that vein the rest of the text will present the warnings of the combined social and natu-
ral drivers of the collapse of the production of bene' ts through the medium of civilisation (a 
common good of humanity as a whole), overview of the structures within the development 
process complementary to civilisation, and unsubstantiated promises of technological leap 
of the physical constraints and of inconsequential unlimited growth. It is only this vainly 
ambitious because the trans-disciplinary review convinces me that the extent and ‘wicked-
ness’ of the problem requires ambitious solution a& empts over and above tried and tested 
instruments of di) erent academic and technological disciplines parcelling individual and 
collective experiences into manageable reductions. And, without further questioning, I write 
this from the position that civilisation is worth preserving. From that I try to show (a) that a 
new organization of knowledge able to interpret the complexity of di) erent scale of collapse 
drivers is needed, (b) that a global subject (‘we’) of those interpretations has to be de' ned, 
and (c) that the concept of collapse has to be given serious thought as a consequence, a pos-
sibility and a future to be avoided at every possible juncture. 
Development, Progress, History and Hopes of Fellow Humans 
‘We live in extraordinary times’, is a long lasting saying usually employed to convey concerns 
regarding social change, big and dramatic events or challenges to everyday existence. But this 
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time it really, really means exactly what it says, despite sounding like crying ‘Wolf!’ when 
' nally the whole (global) village is no longer listening. First of all, ‘We’ is humans alive today, 
all seven billion of us, and this is by far the most humans simultaneously eking a living out of 
Earth’s resources than at any time in history. But, ‘we’ is, more importantly, a smaller group of 
citizens of only 47, out of just under 200, countries with very high human development in-
dex (HDI) value (UNDP 2013). / e lowercase ‘we’ comprises less than one ' + h of humans 
alive today whose countries account for about a half of annual greenhouse gas pollution and 
economic activity, whilst commanding most of military and political power (UNDP 2013). 
A survey of other inequalities on the planet, between and within individual countries, 
would present even more startling ratios of wealth, nutrition, protection from weather condi-
tions and the like. Most of these are well known memes repeated through internet and other 
media, epitomised in artwork2 etc. What is interesting for our purposes is that from a histori-
cal perspective, as the command of materials and energy conversions has risen dramatically 
for the species as a whole, so have inequalities in access and control over them within the 
human species. Yet, we still see ourselves as part of the same potential, if not practical, com-
munity. / is is not just an ideological smokescreen, almost all humans alive today do not 
just share the genetic makeup from a biological perspective, but are a part of the language 
community in a way Wi& genstein (1967) de' ned a family of language games we can all play 
with each other. However much some might feel kinship with their pets, there are communal 
enterprises each human being can undertake with another willing human being that one 
cannot with members of other species. But most people do not need to be told this obvious 
fact anyway; it is a part of majority’s notional moral code. It is worth repeating here lest some-
one concludes from a special historical position that an evolutionary point has been reached 
where those who have are somehow fundamentally di) erent and alienated from those who 
have not. / ey aren’t, and they still live on the same planet with the same scarce resources. 
/ ey just, for some historical and cultural reasons take a much, much larger share of those 
resources than ever before. 
So ' rst and foremost, times are really extraordinary given the number of people on 
the planet. But as that number has been growing exponentially over the last few centuries, 
famines, epidemics, wars and geophysical cataclysms notwithstanding, it must have been 
extraordinary, only a li& le less so, for at least a 150 years now. Something else must be mak-
ing it really, really so. / at is the second special condition. Paul Crutzen coined the name 
“Anthropocene”3 for the new geological era that humans have brought about in the life of the 
planet (cf. Zalasiewicz, Crutzen, and Ste) en 2012 for overview). / e name “Anthropocene” 
suggests that we are living in a special time in which our species, our societies and cultures, 
act with the power of a geophysical force (Archer 2010; Sager 2011). Geophysical forces 
usually involve physical process through which tectonic plates are shi+ ed; major volcanic 
eruptions change the concentration of di) erent compounds in air, sea and soil; or a large 
extra-terrestrial object (an asteroid) strikes the surface of the planet. Well, that should be 
extraordinary enough, but life overall, and some species or ecosystems in particular, have 
played a crucial role in shaping of the bio-physical conditions on the planet before; such as 
increase in the proportion of the highly corrosive oxygen in the atmosphere has been (Ca-
tling 2005). We consider these to have been unintended consequences of unre* exive agents 
though, drawn out over much greater time-spans. 
2 Mladen Stilinović, Nobody wants to see. (“3 richest men in the world own as much as six hundred million of the poorest people”); 
h& p://universes-in universe.org/eng/bien/istanbul_biennial/2009/tour/antrepo/mladen_stilinovic.
3 A number of other di) erent names have been suggested for the new age that humans have ushered in: including the Catastropho-
zoic era, Homogenocene, Myxocene (from the Greek word for “slime”). 
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Going back to Wi& gensteinian language games, ‘we’ tend to consider our re* exive spe-
cies to be at least partially collectively aware of the contemporary potential to perturb the 
everyday reality. And the most obvious such perturbation is the collapse of a complex in-
teraction between the biophysical environment and humanity that underpins the everyday 
edi' ce of civilisation. / ough almost every civilisation in recorded history has undergone a 
collapse at some point, o+ en materially caused by overexploitation of the environment (Dia-
mond 2005; Morris 2011; Montgomery 2012), these were local and regional phenomena in 
the past. In today’s highly interconnected technological society, the threat of civilizational 
collapse is global – both in terms of consequences and in terms of causes (Ehrlich and Ehr-
lich 2012). / e globalized character of contemporary society is itself a historically special 
situation (Burke III 2009), so that almost no human groups today can consider themselves 
truly independent from civilisation however much they may protest their unwillingness to 
be its part. / e globally dispersed humanity is interconnected in a web of civilisation where 
local shake-ups have global consequences (Goldin 2013). However, there is more to our pre-
dicament today than the mere domino e) ect of high economic and cultural interconnected-
ness. / e global ‘We’ that e) ectively, if not politically, constitutes the civilisation is overall 
changing the material conditions on the planet with the power of a geophysical force whilst 
internally composed of structure characterised by vast inequalities of physical impact and 
political power. 
One of the joys of re* exivity provided by language is the possibility to model and exam-
ine the counterfactual (past, future, invisible or abstract) situations and evaluate their desir-
ability from the present experience. Whilst a model is never the perfect replacement for the 
real experience, it is precisely what should, from the evolutionary perspective, di) erentiate 
humans from over-reproducing gas-exhaling bacteria. Such simplifying models aided by 
mathematical rationalisation and computing power have for a few decades been warning of 
the consequences of overshoot of civilization’s consumption over what the biophysical mani-
fold on the planet can regenerate from the solar input. What is interesting in the more recent 
modelling (Motesharrei, Rivas and Kalnay 2014) is that a combination of resource depletion 
and excessive inequality radically speeds up the total collapse of civilisation compared to let-
ting each of those collapse-drivers act alone. What is more it seems that the socio-technolog-
ical structure, in which resource depletion is mediated through the poor but bene' ts and is 
governed by the extraordinarily rich, acts as a veil hiding the warnings of rapid collapse from 
those best positioned to act on them. / rough a toxic mix of excessive resource depletion 
and excessive inequality we lose our re* exive potential as a species, making us more akin to 
the oxygenating bacteria of a geologically very distant past. / is is why we must cry ‘Wolf!’ 
for real this time, and truly accept that we live in really, really extraordinary times. 
‘Desparate, but not Serious’ – An Academic Exposition 
In everyday language away from abstract mathematical modelling of humanity-nature inter-
actions we need to talk about material and labour-related bene' ts that contemporary civilisa-
tion provides for most of the populations in the developed North and West. / at is houses, 
cars, and computers through which texts like this are exchanged, and the literacy dedicated 
time to exchange them. / e availability of abundant cheap energy derived from fossil fuels 
has freed modern societies from massive physical labour in the sustenance of civilisation, 
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enabled us to live more productive lives and reduced proportional levels of physical violence 
detrimental to individual wellbeing (Wills 2013). At the same time, it has overwhelming-
ly contributed to a global irreversible change in climates, ushering a potential collapse of 
contemporary human civilisations around the globe (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2013). Notwith-
standing this fundamental energy-culture paradox, ‘developed’ human societies also remain 
welded to the idea that their overall wellbeing lies in the ability to increase the global output 
of goods and services by at least 5% per year, despite clear signs that continuing down this 
path is destructive (Graeber 2011). So the important question of 21st century development 
becomes why populations of political units (states, more or less loose federations and the 
like) must be promised an increase in goods and services year on year for a hope of wellbeing. 
/ e most plausible retort is that as presently not all members, with equal potentials and 
notionally equal rights have equal access to the bene' ts extracted from resources and energy, 
and converted into goods and services. / e bene' ts are now scarce, and as they increase 
overall there will supposedly be more for everyone. But social structures distributing those 
bene' ts are such that they further exacerbate rather than reduce the inequality globally, only 
exacerbating the feeling of have-nots that more has to be created so that they could share in 
the spoils. It is important to note that the last sentence, from a global perspective, refers not 
so much to those without food, shelter and medication, but those without a whole other 
range of consumables. / e debt-driven path of ever expanding production of consumables 
would in itself be problematic (Graeber 2011), but it is now coupled with the approaching 
tipping points of irreversible climate change. A more academic response would also point 
out that the structure of ' nancing production in capitalism through borrowing with interest, 
whilst at the same time producing goods in constant competition with other producers, of 
necessity forces the rise in GDP and resource consumption simply to ' nance the original in-
terest incurring debt. Is it possible to design su0  ciently large and therefore sustainable socie-
ties not deriving their wellbeing from regular increase of production of goods and services? 
Meta-assessments of research in physical and social sciences, such as those issued by 
the IPCC working groups (h& p://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/index.shtml), warn that be-
yond 4°C of near-surface warming above the pre-industrial average temperature (which is 
where the current development model is heading), lie severe irreversible material changes 
for which we have no adaptation capacity. In other words, without mitigation of causes of 
global climate change, our civilisation will probably not be able to adapt to the ensuing cli-
matic and biophysical changes. Given the scienti' c and cultural development over the last 
few millennia, we may say that the way the world works today leads to there being no ‘world’ 
in some near future. / is is not to say that there will be no humans, but the civilisation that 
humans have been developing over the past few millennia, and through which we interpret 
our wellbeing and environment, will wither away with sudden disappearance of its biophysi-
cal foundation (crops, resources and weather pa& erns). Not only is its physical resource base 
depleting at a scale that is unmatched by innovative resource replacements, but the ecosys-
tems that the human population depends on for nutrient circulation are collapsing as well. 
A good illustration of adaptation capacities and collapse outcomes is provided by the 
seas, the primary habitat on the planet that we only peripherally inhabit (and thus are less 
aware of), but readily exploit for nutrition and biological resources. Many regions have in 
the last decades been devoid of ' sh stocks, but swamped by ancient and e) ective, o+ en sting-
ing and unpalatable jelly' sh. Whilst our own population growth and technological prow-
ess drive us to overextract the ' sheries capital, ancient and resilient organisms such as the 
unpalatable medusa (a stage in life of the jelly' sh) thrive and create eutrophic dead zones 
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eventually inhospitable to human utilisation. / ere are organisms, like the jelly' sh, that are 
perfectly capable of thriving in zones where ecosystems that humans have co-evolved with 
wobble and fall, but there is no room for humans, such as we are today, in those fallen zones. 
/ ese organisms, though, can also teach us a lesson through their ability to ‘degrow’ even 
individual bodies when their own ecosystem support is scarce (Gershwin 2013). In that 
manner they sustain self-in* icted growth reductions, but essentially endure unchanged as 
a species. / e jelly' sh illustrate how life in general can prevail through sudden disturbances 
of slowly evolved ecosystems (as jelly' sh are also alive), but also how inhospitable to human 
* ourishing these impoverished ecosystems can be. Not only do the medusa sting, but jel-
ly' sh on the whole drown out other life forms and clog up technological equipment used in 
seawater. / ey are highly resilient to human deterrents and most of the time act like another 
blind geophysical force, they simply dri+  on the currents. 
Pu& ing it simply, humanity can pursue business-as-usual hoping for the best whilst re-
searchers in some disciplines know we are heading for a fall, or make a deep-rooted switch to 
sustainability using our collective knowledge in an a& empt to restore and maintain a ‘green 
equilibrium’ (Wills 2013) that we depend on for individual wellbeing as much as we do on 
air or social cooperation (Wilson 2012). A lesson from this biological concept is that sta-
ble, vibrant, abundant, diverse and resilient ecosystems result from a wide variety of envi-
ronmental pressures and biological components: conversion of Sun’s energy into biological 
structures, predators and prey, parasites, geophysical events. None of the ‘green equilibria’ 
are permanent. As the pressures a) ecting relative frequencies of species’ populations within 
an ecosystem change so do the ecological structures and genetic equilibria within it. 
But many of the species within an ecosystem that have had the evolutionary time to reach 
an equilibrium role most o+ en have a high ecological diversity and very high within-species 
genetic diversity. As a species and a piece of the ‘green equilibrium’ puzzle they have a stock 
of fall-back options in times of change. In biological terms, as the physical environment 
changes its biological species can draw on the said diversities to increase the chance that 
some member of the ecosystem will survive through the change. Diversity engenders the 
overall resilience of the system. But human Anthropocene forces have pushed many of the 
slowly evolved ‘green equilibria’ suddenly and far out of balance, whilst reducing diversity 
of the ecosystems we draw resources from. Beyond a certain point, they cannot recover the 
overall system stability out of their own stock of fall-back options, as they have not evolved 
to face the speci' c pressures of the very recent Anthropocene. 
As researchers, educators and innovators (social or technological) we must be broadly 
aware of our species’ straddling of processes of vastly di) erent scales ordinarily relegated 
to separate disciplines of discourse: the dynamics of inanimate Earth system, history of life 
and human evolution, the history of globalised industrial civilisation, and the collective in-
tellectual creativity of humans freed from muscular toil for everyday sustenance (McNeill 
and McNeill 2003). / e task is to ' nd a voice that speaks from this straddling perspective. 
Once the references are surveyed and texts have been wri& en and read, human beings as 
a species of 7 billion equivalent individuals no longer have an option of backslide to the 
‘state of nature’ where happy and ignorant bliss prevailed. Historic state of 7 billion of us on 
limited planet other than a painful collapse, is a civilisation – inevitably plural, dynamic and 
complex (Pagden 2013). Civilisation then and now involves some form of coordination and 
subjugation. It is a combination of awareness of physical and social limits of development 
with technological and political instruments to guide development within those limits. An 
obvious enough point, but what is the acceptable such form that reduces insecurity and pro-
motes emancipation? 
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History of Development Components: Shortcomings 
of the Technological Fix 
As literate humans we have been taught to pride ourselves in belonging to a species that not 
only produced a civilisation, but managed to do so through increasingly e0  cient use of natu-
ral resources thanks to the ingenuity of the technological invention. Such a narrative ignores 
other necessary components of the civilisation construction which coevolve with technolo-
gy, and is the basis for the vain hope that the present predicament will also be altered through 
technological ingenuity – an e0  cient and clean source of energy. 
Most of what produced our current civilisation resulted from the ‘developmentalist pro-
ject’: state-building, sedentarization and intensi' cation of the exploitation of available re-
sources (Pomeranz 2009); a manifold on which the bene' ts of civilisation are constructed. 
It enabled increases in average life expectancy and general physical health, as well as rise in 
population, although not automatically an even distribution of these bene' ts. / e compre-
hensive historical narratives suggest that basic ontological categories of the developmentalist 
project are (1) technological mechanisms of energy conversions, (2) social structures that 
utilise the said energy and maintain the technological mechanisms, and (3) the governance 
mechanisms that supervise and maintain the social structure energy utilisation. 
/ ese structures describe the time-protracted processes of the developmentalist project 
enactment, not the actual societies and civilisations embodying the contemporary outcome 
of the project at any given time. But again, this Meccano-style modelling is important here only 
to indicate that the potential for overall global equlibirum-restoration is not just through the 
modi' cation in one of the components 1-3, as the present predicament has evolved through 
contingent changes in each of the components. With rise in population and material well-
being, energy available for conversion for human needs was always everywhere eventually 
capped, resource limits have been reached. Within very recent history, which is the most rel-
evant developmentalist lesson for contemporary societies, gambles on technological change 
(component 1), and imperatives of growth and centralised state-power (component 1 and 3) 
have dominated in order to make the unpalatable deep social structural change (component 
2) unnecessary even in the nominally socialist societies (Weiner 2009). 
Long-term ecosystem stability and human populations were already at odds in domi-
nant civilisations of East and West in early modern period, through shortage of biomass as 
energy and construction resource, and a depletion of fertility of the soils (Pomeranz 2000). 
It is o+ en simplistically assumed that the steam engine was a miraculous breakthrough that 
enabled early modern European (Western) societies to escape this ecological bind of pop-
ulation-energy-food imbalance through intellectual ingenuity. Industrious humans applied 
Reason to uncover the secrets deliberately concealed in physical processes and that way they 
extracted more bene' ts from a seemingly depleted physical foundation. However, more elab-
orate analyses (for example De Vries 1993; Pomeranz 2000; Arrighi et al. 2003) reveal that 
Western developmentalist project was sustained, and headed for the present perilous predic-
ament, along a decidedly contingent path of territorial expansion and more or less deliberate 
transformations in social structures and governance mechanisms alongside and even before 
technological breakthroughs. / e East Asian path, eventually outcompeted by or incorpo-
rated into the aforementioned Western one, was no less e0  cient in energy conversion (1) 
or its rebalancing within the overall population-food constraints. A di) erent combination of 
society (2), technology (1) and governance (3) was applied in the dominant early modern 
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civilisations of the East, resulting in di) erent resolution of ecosystem-population imbalance 
until the globalising spread of the fossil fuelled Western form of developmentalism. 
Since the Industrial age in the West the developmental paradigm relied on the expan-
sion of the capitalist mode of production, providing most of the material underpinning of 
what humans today call civilisation. Even 20th century experiments with alternative forms 
of economic organisation through state socialism, also unwaveringly pursued economic 
growth and technological intensi' cation of energy conversion as drivers of hope for wellbe-
ing (Weiner 2009). So today there are hopes for a technological ' x along the lines of the 
aforementioned simplistic assumption of the revolution in energy conversion mechanisms 
(1) brought about by the technological utilisation of coal as a fossil fuel. But there is no his-
torical evidence of successful state-wide reduction of climate-change-inducing greenhouse 
gas emissions except in the historical collapse of industrial society in the Russian Federation 
since 1990s. / at was certainly not a technological breakthrough, but a technological regress 
accompanied by drastic changes in social structures (Ho) man 2011). 
Historically also we have witnessed a large rebound e) ect where the resource e0  ciency 
gains have been made (‘the energy is now pollution free so we can use that much more of 
it’) and very small next to no reduction of environmental impact per unit of output along the 
whole energy conversion technology supply chain. A particular technological mechanism 
may, once it is installed, produce ‘clean energy’, but may not have been su0  ciently clean in 
coming to that stage to warrant hopes for a technological revolution that on its own removes 
the climate change constraint. A novel energy conversion mechanism, free from the climate-
change constraint, will not necessarily supply energy to the society in the form the current 
fossil fuels do. / e distribution of energy through the social structures in the developmental-
ist process will change with it, as is the case with existing renewable solar and wind electricity 
sources which are weather- and geography- dependent and not transportable in the same way 
that fossil fuels have become. 
Finally, supposing that the novel energy conversion mechanism was found, it would have 
to be distributed through the large and growing human population very quickly in order to 
have the desired global e) ect on climate change (Ho) man 2011). It is a challenge to answer 
whether such a distribution would be possible without signi' cant modi' cations to the exist-
ing governance mechanisms and social structures of energy distribution. / ough techno-
logically more developed and politically more interconnected than ever before, can we bring 
the carbon intensity of the global human population to less than pre-industrial levels, whilst 
maintaining the population size at 10 times pre-industrial level, with only the change of the 
dominant technological mechanisms of energy conversion, and within half of a human indi-
vidual’s lifetime (30-40 years)? 
[Technologies] developed to resolve one problem o+ en end up creating myriad new, of-
ten unanticipated, problems. [… All of the proposed] types of technology-focused “' xes” 
are highly controversial, risky and bring with them the potential for serious environmental 
harm. An overemphasis on technology also tends to displace solutions to problems that are 
simple, yet e) ective, and reinforces the belief that [other structural changes] are not neces-
sary in order to reduce humanity’s impact on the planet. (Tienhaara 2009: 18)
Whilst energy is available in the physical environment of planet Earth, and needs to be con-
verted to useful forms and transported through technological ingenuity, it is futile to hope 
that a su0  ciently widespread and e0  cient mechanism will be ‘discovered’ in the time it takes 
to avoid a collapse. Perseverance of civilisations – plural, dynamic and complex – will require 
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timely and ingenuous adjustments to social structures and governance mechanisms to make 
up for the shortfall from energy conversion mechanisms employed for their sustainability 
potential. What exactly might these look like on the ground? Let’s start planning from know-
ing how drastically fossil fuel energy conversions must be limited, a global cap on GHG emissions. 
Capitalism as the Evolving Social Structure? 
Early modern ecosystem-populations imbalance in the East was addressed by the labour-
intensive development project not focused on territorial expansion aided by technological 
transcendence of energy conversion constrictions (Wood 2002; Pomeranz 2000), as in the 
‘industrious’ development of the East (Sugihara 2003). Whilst historians struggle to explain 
the contingencies that lead to divergence of development paths between East and West 
since early modern times, for our purposes here it is important to note that “these are not 
due to the fact that the progressive West discovered capitalism and the modern state and 
China did not” (Rowe 1990: 262). / ere are also examples of environmental resources gov-
erned through commons that meet the economic needs of the human population without 
being overexploited, or resulting in disproportional accumulation between the ‘commoners’. 
Whilst these alternatives are not pro' t-maximising and are o+ en purposefully localised rath-
er than globalised, they combine material bene' ts with environmental sustainability and can 
thus begin to make sense in ‘Western’ terms too (Pomeranz 2009). One should expect that 
technological (1), social (2), but also governance (3) innovation can expand the scale of past 
communing practices. Could reliance on the extensive knowledge of natural and social his-
torical processes help make the formerly localised alternatives bene' t the global population? 
Capitalism, as a contingent outcome of speci' c historical conditions, rests on the impera-
tive of constant self-expansion rooted in wholesale transformation of the metabolic exchange 
with the rest of the biosphere and distribution of life’s basic necessities within human socie-
ties (Wood 2002). Its growth imperative coupled well with the localised transcendence of 
the bio-physical limits through fossil-fuel innovation in technological mechanisms of energy 
conversion (Rundgren 2013). In other words, the steam engine and territorial expansion for 
essential resources reinforced each other. But the dubiously ‘winning’ formula was provided 
by the absence of governance (3) “hostility to any individual making himself “abnormally” 
rich” (Braudel 1982: 589). It is also characterised by regular stagnation and downturns, with 
associated reductions in environmental impact and increase in human existential misery – 
although this relationship has not always been linear due at least in part to ‘extra-economic’ 
interventions of the kind that societal and governance changes could impose in the current 
situation too (Wood 2002: 93). Now that the expansion cannot continue in territorial and 
material sense, a miraculous technological breakthrough in energy conversion is not provid-
ed whilst a lot of the collapse-inducing technology is locked in, democratization and strategic 
degrowth of economies, and changes in income-distribution remain the only avenue open in 
developmentalist project we base civilisation on. 
Apart from the creative-destructive e) ects of capitalism on social structures, widespread 
dispossession, intense exploitation, and immoral disregard for human life in the interest of 
pro' t, it was the productivity-for-pro' t rather than the structural novelty of technological 
mechanisms that was initially manifested in the irresponsible land use and reduction of bio-
sphere’s regenerative capacity (Wood 2002). Productivity-for-pro' t rather than widespread 
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bene' t distribution set the modern unsustainable train in motion, the imperative of growth 
cloaked as promise of emancipation. / at in itself was a forceful, not simply evolutionary, 
change of social structures, which had to be imposed from above by those members of the 
society who bene' ted most from it (Hobsbawm 1952). Rather than simply occurring once 
the steam engine and ' nancial capital became available, it had to be actively fought for by 
members of society who recognised their most immediate interest in it. And those were not 
simply citizens hungry for more variety in co& on cloth and earthenware, but more nefarious 
individuals (Rundgren 2013). It is still resisted when forced upon people in non-Western 
‘underdeveloped’ societies. Even the ‘developed’ democratic populations aim to resist tech-
nologically risky economic growth policies, whilst over a certain threshold increase in wages 
will not compel those populations to work more (Barry 2012). Globally speaking capitalist 
growth imperative is a harmful mechanism fed o)  increasing inequalities hiding behind a 
promise of increase in education, health, communication and food production for people 
who need it most. 
Far from arguing for the return to pre-modern agrarian social structures, which were 
themselves also an outcome of developmentalist project and not a benevolent ‘state of na-
ture’, let’s propose that the current threat of collapse can be addressed by purposeful re-or-
ganisation of (2) social structures and (3) governance mechanisms. / ese two components 
of civilisation should be aimed at maintaining its bene' ts in combination with the multifac-
eted transformations of the energy conversion technology that are existing, simple and ef-
fective (Tienhaara 2009). Whilst it is made meaningful in communities and within political 
units, this is a change to be enacted globally. / is wholesome requirement comes from the 
global nature of climate change, the global mechanisms that enforce the ‘resource depletion 
+ inequalities’ collapse of civilisation described above (Motesharrei, Rivas and Kalnay 2014) 
and the fact that developmentalist project globally is tied in a single global capitalist fossil 
fuel sustained society now (Arrighi et al. 2003). 
Perhaps the most important lesson of historical appraisal of capitalism as a contingent 
outcome of the developmentalist project (Wood 2002; Pomeranz 2000; Sugihara 2003) is 
that once capitalism’s mechanisms for social reproduction and development have been estab-
lished at one locale it inevitably transforms all others. Its inherent logic of expansion eventu-
ally forces other human societies with which it is in interaction to resort to exploitation of 
humans and environment, which is another strong argument for why we must understand 
the current crisis as global in character. Apart from that, it also suggests that the transforma-
tion of social structure and governance mechanisms should be more substantive than the 
so+ ening of the pro' t ethic through ‘social market’ or ‘market socialism’ (Wood 2002: 195). 
/ e growth imperative spreads faster even than ideologies employed in its justi' cation, and 
the hope for a ‘green growth’ brings much false hope and excuses for inaction in the crunch 
of extraordinary times (Ho) man 2011). 
What Kind of Transformation is Needed to Avoid the Collapse? 
While there is no universal and widely accessible energy source or technological e0  ciency 
breakthrough available to maintain current population and pro' t growth within climate and 
ecosystem equilibrium limits (Li 2008; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2103), there is already a host of 
smaller scale technological mechanisms ' t for a more sustainable energy extraction. While 
not implying a return to the pre-modern age, these strategies involve transformations in so-
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cial structure, governance mechanisms and a thorough re-evaluation of components that 
make up our understanding of human wellbeing. Democratization of economic practices, 
changes in social distribution of incomes as tokens of access to energy conversions, and a cul-
ture decoupling civilizational a& ainment from consumption behaviour are the transforma-
tive directions for the developmentalism of the 21st century. 
Standing at the end of a long line of analyses of what is unsustainable about our present 
existence and wherefrom these characteristics historically arose, this text and its role in the 
journal cannot be but a rallying call to intellectual mobilisation concerning the projected and 
as yet untrodden future. Historical analyses coupled with abstract modelling of interaction 
of basic ontological categories in society-ecosystems-resources nexus allow for projections 
in which collapse could be inde' nitely avoided and human population brought into stable 
equilibrium with the rest of the global ecosystem if the per capita rate of resource extraction 
for energy conversion remains at the naturally renewable level, and if the bene' ts of this 
extraction are distributed in a reasonably equitable fashion (Motesharrei, Rivas and Kalnay 
2014). On the other hand they also suggest that over-extraction and rise in inequalities most 
likely lead to a relatively swi+  collapse (Meadows, Meadows and Randers 1972; Moteshar-
rei, Rivas, and Kalnay 2014), which is initially invisible to the top echelons shielded by their 
wealth until the ecosystem collapse brings about a visible collapse of the primary producers 
(Motesharrei, Rivas, and Kalnay 2014). By which point it is too late to change the course. 
Whilst a collapse of the current global civilisation would stop the developmentalist 
project in its tracks, along with its ecologically detrimental but also humanly emancipatory 
outcome, humans’ intellectual straddling of processes of vastly di) erent scales allows us to 
design a sustainable degrowth project (Kallis 2011). / e developmentalist project has hith-
erto not operated in the state of equilibrium, but there is nothing in principle preventing it 
from a& ainting that state, just as new species eventually reach a novel state of ‘green equilib-
rium’ with resilient ecosystems. / is is a historic turn in the developmentalist path, a political 
project of transformation of global governance mechanism and a re-evaluating of individual 
wellbeing. It is a vision of a civilised society with leaner and stable overall energy conversion 
output, where wellbeing is structured through equality, interpersonal relations and simplic-
ity. As weavers of narratives academics and researchers must bring to human understanding 
the processes unfolding on non-human scales, and this time round try to do it in emancipa-
tory fashion in order to degrow but not destroy the civilizational accomplishments (techno-
logical and social) to date. 
/ ere are three important points to take home from this. Firstly it is important to train 
oneself to adopt a perspective where one can accept the possibility of the * ow of history 
being dramatically upset (a collapse). / e second is to realise that the path to this state has 
been a ma& er of contingent historical choices, however minute individuals’ impact on them 
has been or is today. And ' nally, it is important to realise that material constraints of climate 
change and resource depletion, and social constraints of inequality inherent in the ideal of 
unlimited economic growth are “two sides of the same coin” (Beck 2010: 257). If we were 
to put ourselves seriously into the standpoint of a future collapse as if it were already ex-
perienced, knowing the contingencies of history and a necessary interaction of technologi-
cal and social components of developmentalism’s contribution to civilisation-building, we 
could consciously entertain the past counterfactual possibilities with an a) ective urgency. “If 
we had done this and that, the catastrophe we are in now would not have occurred!” (Žižek 
2008: 461). From such a vision comes the real strength to break the bonds of individual 
insigni' cance: get up and act today for the collapse not to occur. Welcome to the thinking 
for the 22nd century!
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Danijela Dolenec
Group 22, Zagreb
Attacking a Wicked Problem: Advancing Alternative Conceptions 
of Wellbeing En Route to Sustainable Degrowth
When Ri& el and Webber ' rst de' ned a “wicked problem” (1973), they did not have in 
mind our current struggle to ' nd socially sustainable responses to global environmental 
challenges. / ey were developing a general argument about the limits of policy responses 
to important social issues and they wanted to draw a& ention to the fact that the classical sci-
ence paradigm which lies at the foundation of modern conceptions of development is not 
applicable to societal problems. While problems in the natural sciences are “de' nable and 
separable and may have solutions that are ' ndable”, key social challenges of today are none of 
these things. Probably the crucial distinction among them is in that social problems do not 
have solutions; at best they get re-solved again and again given that they rely on outcomes of 
political struggles (ibid.). 
/ is concept of a wicked problem was recently applied to climate change (Levin et al. 
2012), ascribing it with four key features: time is running out; those who cause the prob-
lem also seek to provide a solution; the central authority needed to address them is weak or 
non-existent, and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses into the future. / ese 
features lead to the latest version of the good old tragedy of the commons: governments fail to 
respond even though it is well recognized that actions must take place soon to avoid cata-
strophic future impacts. / e latest IPCC reports (2014) clearly state that without rapid and 
serious mitigation e) orts human societies will not be able to adapt to the ensuing climatic 
and biophysical challenges. 
Characterising climate change as a wicked problem is one of the entry points Doma-
zet uses to focus our a& ention on the urgency of the task at hand, given that we agree with 
him that human civilisation as it stands today is worth preserving. I too start from that as-
sumption, even though I acknowledge that, paradoxically, while we consider re* exivity as 
our distinctive feature in relation to Earth’s other species, our impact on the planet has be-
come akin to geophysical forces such as the shi+ ing of tectonic plates or volcanic eruptions 
(Archer 2010). Since our physical impact on the planet has reached a point where we can-
not continue our territorial and material expansion, we should abandon the naive hope in a 
technological ' x. Instead we should recognise that the wickedness of this problem requires 
going far beyond technocratic tinkering parcellised into traditional academic disciplines and 
towards embracing a deeply ambitious political project of making a deep-rooted switch to 
sustainability (Wills 2013). 
In other words, it requires recognising that the switch to sustainability is a profoundly 
social challenge, involving primarily changes to social practices, institutions and governance 
mechanisms by applying principles of democratisation, egalitarian redistribution and de-
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growth. Our task as “weavers of narratives” (cf. Domazet) is therefore absurdly ambitious – it 
consists of nothing short of re-imagining the developmentalist project so that it aligns human 
wellbeing with practices that ensure our material sustainability on the planet. Faced with 
such a Gargantuan task, the only way forward I can see is in dancing the double-step of big 
thinking while making small practical proposals. Levin et al. (2012) propose that we design 
policies which will “constrain our future collective selves”, by which they mean intervening 
into our social and political practices in ways which are sticky in that they will become en-
trenched, expanding support over time. How do we start? 
/ e elephant in the room which connects our physical impact on the planet with social 
constraints of inequality is capitalism, which is inextricably wedded to the principle of in' -
nite economic growth (Wood 2002). Given that the growth imperative is a structural feature 
of capitalism in all its varieties (Harvey 2007), there is basically no way of reconciling the 
capitalist mode of production with a genuine switch to sustainable degrowth (Kallis 2011). 
/ erefore, what lies ahead is a series of deep changes in our basic institutons governing land, 
labour and money, towards an economic system that will no longer be identi' able as capital-
ism (ibid.). However, given the current constellation of power, winning popular support for a 
transition of that magnitude is unlikely to say the least. Instead, we look for cracks in the sys-
tem where we can insert policy proposals with potentially transformative e) ects. One such 
policy proposal is in decoupling concepts of wellbeing from consumption behaviour, pri-
marily through replacing GDP as a measure of progress with alternative indicators of welfare.
Over time we have accepted GDP as a measure of welfare, though it was never designed 
to measure more than pure market economic activity (Kubiszewski et al. 2013). Not only 
that, GDP interprets every expense as positive and fails to distinguish welfare-enhancing 
from welfare-reducing activities (Talberth et al. 2007), so that an oil spill increases GDP be-
cause of associated costs of cleanup, while growing vegetables and cooking home meals does 
not get included in a country’s GDP. In addition to that, GDP says nothing about within-
society distribution of income, though this is one of the primary determinants of individual 
wellbeing (Wilkinson and Picke&  2009).
Ever since the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (2009) report, momentum has been growing around 
the design of alternative indicators of wellbeing and progress which would be& er integrate 
economic with environmental and social dimensions (Costanza et al. 2004). In recent years 
we have witnessed the development of a host of alternative measures that aim to capture 
aspects of human wellbeing, security and quality of life, such as the Happy Planet Index,4 the 
Genuine Progress Indicator5 or OECD’s Be& er Life Initiative.6 Closer to home, Group 22 
has published analyses7 which shed light on Croatia’s development trajectory and future per-
spectives by using UN’s Human Development Index, the Ecological Footprint index, as well 
as a host of indicators capturing levels of income inequality (GINI, risk-of poverty, material 
deprivation etc.). We have shown that societies on the European semi-periphery are poorer, 
which should according to theoretical expectations (Franzen and Mayer 2010) predispose 
them to be less likely to act towards environmental prerequisites for a sustainability switch 
(Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012). However, despite a lower commitment to individual 
material sacri' ce, concerns on behalf of the environment and global empathy in these socie-
ties is higher than might be infered from their level of development, as measured by GDP. It 
4 Information available at h& p://www.happyplanetindex.org/.
5 Information available at: h& p://genuineprogress.net/.
6 OECD Be& er Life Initiative h& p://www.oecd.org/statistics/be& erlifeinitiativemeasuringwell-beingandprogress.htm.
7 See for instance We need to Change (2012), as well as several texts in the recently published Sustainability Perspectives % om the 
European Semi-periphery (2014).
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is worth also adding that these are societies with a signi' cantly lower environmental impact, 
globally and o+ en even locally; societies which carry a comparatively lower historical im-
perative to initiate the global sustainability switch. 
A crucial obstacle to wider action is in fact inequality, given that the bene' ts of economic 
growth and development over the last 20 years have not been equitably distributed. Decreas-
ing inequality therefore becomes a priority, since this is a precondition for developing social 
relations of trust and cooperation. We cannot expect collective action when material condi-
tions of life and resulting life chances are so disparate as to separate citizens into di) erent 
socio-material realities (Sandel 2012). Without a basic sense of shared humanity we cannot 
engage in a democratic debate on the features of a just and sustainable society (Wright 2011).
/ ough the introduction of alternative measures of wellbeing does not take us as far as we 
need to go, hopefully it represents a step in the right direction by carrying transformative po-
tential. Fraser (2000, 2003) distinguishes between a0  rmative and transformative strategies 
with respect to how they relate to underlying social structures and outcomes they generate. 
A0  rmative strategies aim to correct inequitable outcomes without disturbing the underly-
ing social structures while transformative strategies aim directly at the underlying genera-
tive framework, which clearly makes them more desirable. However, they are at the same 
time more di0  cult to execute since they are highly vulnerable to collective action problems. 
Given these characteristics, Fraser (2003) suggests that practical policy proposals should ' t 
somewhere along the continuum of these two identi' ed poles.
Taking this on board, if our aim is to transform our economic and social practices to the 
extent that they are no longer recongisable under the label of ‘capitalism’, perhaps the con-
ceptualisation of alternative measures of wellbeing is one such strategy. It surely represents a 
reorientation from income and GDP measurements towards concepts of welfare and wellbe-
ing, which is one of the descriptions that Kallis (2011) uses to explain the concept of sus-
tainable degrowth. A succesfull decoupling of wellbeing from a ' xation on economic growth 
may be an important contribution to making degrowth a viable political strategy. As many 
authors have argued, it is important to realise that sustainable degrowth is not equivalent to 
negative GDP growth. / at phenomenon already has a name, recession, and we have unfor-
tunately grown to know it very well during the last years, together with its palle& e of nega-
tive social outcomes such as unemployment, economic insecurity and social upheaval. In 
contrast, sustainable degrowth rests on the idea that we can downshi+  the economy through 
institutional changes, by collectively managing ‘a prosperous way down’ (Odum and Odum 
2001) through a political process of choosing to have, for instance, fewer airplanes and cars 
but be& er social services, more public space and greater personal autonomy.
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Vladimir Cvijanović 
Group 22, Zagreb
Institutional Innovations for a New Economy
Understanding the con' nes of the prevailing socio-economic system, let alone institutional 
innovations that redress its main shortcomings, requires a system perspective that is not 
shared by all schools of economic thought. Furthermore, as de' nitions of “new economy” 
may di) er we will use this phrase to denote an economy that maximizes societal wellbeing 
and not only that of certain societal groups. One of the possible approaches, renowned for 
its institutional and structural perspective as well as by its historicity, is o) ered by the French 
Regulation / eory that we will employ in this paper. 
For Boyer, the Régulation approach presents itself as a research programme of gathering 
together historical studies, international comparisons and macro-economic tests with the 
goal of identifying some typical con' gurations of modes of development and their crises. 
When these crisis tendencies are mitigated, ‘régulation’ is said to occur. ( James 2009: 185)
While a thorough description of / e Régulation approach (- ) is beyond the scope of this 
paper here is only a brief outline. It conducts analysis on three di) erent levels: 1. mode of 
production – such as feudalism or capitalism, 2. regime of accumulation – a socio-econom-
ic order that is in place between two structural crises and that spurs accumulation; and 3. 
institutional or structural forms (monetary regime, wage-labour nexus, forms of competi-
tion, forms of insertion into the international regime, forms of the state) (Boyer and Saillard 
2002). Based on these foundations the researchers mostly studied Fordism, a period of some 
thirty years a+ er the Second World War, but also post-Fordism, the current phase which suc-
ceeded the former. In the countries of the west Fordism was characterised by intensive accu-
mulation (Brand and Wissen 2011), stable international monetary system and li& le exposure 
to international competition, stable work relationships and welfare states. Post Fordism has 
been marked by an extensive accumulation (ibid.), a demise of the stable Bre& on Woods 
international monetary system, ' nancialisation (as an increase in signi' cance of the ' nancial 
sector), technological changes as well as the diminution of the welfare state.
A gap between the Régulation approach and ecological considerations have partially 
been addressed by Lipietz (see Whiteside 1996) and more explicitly by Raza (1999), who 
calls for an introduction of the sixth structural form “nature-society relationship”. In absence 
of the fully developed concept that would bridge this gap we can borrow the concept called 
socio-ecological regime which links socio-economic with biophysical characteristics of a so-
cietal system as well as the usage of energy and materials (Sieferle et al. 2006 as in Spash and 
Schandl 2009: 50) allowing us to observe an immense increase of energy and material use 
per capita and per area as well as CO2 emissions per capita between the historical agrarian 
regime and the one that followed with the onset of the industrial revolution – the industrial 
regime (Krausmann et al. 2008 as in Spash and Schandl 2009: 53). / e energy and material 
use has been in direct correlation with the economic growth, measured by the increase in 
gross domestic product (GDP). Hence although it is theoretically possible to imagine eco-
nomic growth without overutilisation of natural resources historical evidence does not seem 
to support this.
Indeed, the connection between economic growth and overutilisation of natural re-
sources cannot be broken up as easily, as Brand and Wissen (2011: 25) remind us (own 
translation):
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[T]he fossile production and consumption pa& erns… are anchored deeply in societal 
power relations, common sense and everyday practices of the peoples of the global North 
and increasingly also of the global South, just as they are anchored in overall orientation on 
economic growth and competitiveness.
When we add to it a problem of inequality that Domazet writes about in this Volume but also 
of persistently high (youth) unemployment rates that have been present in some western 
countries since the onset of the so called Great Recession from 2007/8 onwards, then we can 
easily come to the conclusion that the prevailing economic system has failed. However there 
are no value-free and ready made institutional innovations that would amend the system, 
but only options one may chose. Although not explicitly encompassing ecological system 
in its theoretical apparatus the Régulation approach’s emphasis on historically stable socio-
economic constellations lead us to the conclusion that many variations in socio-economic 
systems are possible. As Jessop (2013: 13) asserts: 
Whether or not the search for solutions to economic crisis restores the prevailing accumu-
lation regime and its mode of regulation does not depend solely on the objective features 
of the crisis and the feasibility of resolving it within this framework. It also depends on the 
institutional, organisational and learning capacities of the social forces seeking to resolve 
the crisis and on the outcome of the contest to de' ne the nature of the crisis, to explain its 
various objective causes, to a& ribute blame for its development, and to identify the most 
appropriate solutions. 
Stockhammer (2013) ' nds that ' nancialisation, shrinking of the welfare state as well as glo-
balisation are the main causes behind falling wage share in the past quarter of a century, all 
of which contributed to rising inequalities. Indeed, the current socio-economic crisis itself 
is caused by ' nancialisation and an intensifying inequality (Stockhammer 2012). Hence, 
Stockhammer (2012: 64) concludes one should:
advocate de' nancialization. / is would imply a shrinking of the ' nancial sector, a stronger 
voice of stakeholders, such as labour unions, at the expense of shareholders in corporate 
governance; it would also aim at replacing the logic of pro' t (or shareholder value) maxi-
mization in many social areas by a democratically determined policy priorities and princi-
ples of solidarity. 
While that is uncontroversial in terms of progressive economic policy that is democratic and 
socio-economically viable the following part of his conclusion is wri& en from the perspec-
tive of economic growth and will therefore not ' nd wide support among environmentally 
conscious social scientists (Stockhammer 2012: 64):“[H]igher wage growth is one condi-
tion for re-establishing a viable growth regime. Wages have to increase at least with produc-
tivity growth”. Indeed, such reformist policy solution seeks to resolve stability in the econ-
omy by ensuring unabated economic growth through more just distribution of income in 
the economy (progressive taxation is an obvious choice here). But if we cannot manage to 
ensure decoupling of economic growth from overutilisation of Earth’s resources and energy 
use then this policy alone cannot be a viable alternative in itself.
A radical solution is represented by the concept as well as the policy initiative of (sustain-
able) degrowth that is intended to reduce society’s overall use of material and energy, since 
it is believed that this cannot happen with increasing GDP. However, this is not the same as 
striving for negative GDP growth rates (Kallis 2011: 874). Pursuing sustainable degrowth 
means ' nding institutional innovations on many di) erent issues.
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[O]ne proposal is to introduce global caps on key resources such as oil and CO2 emissions 
that are shared equitably between nations on a per capita basis (“cap and share,” Douthwaite 
2011), and are declining over time. In addition, degrowth proponents put forward three 
more propositions in order to respond to the negative e) ects of economic contraction 
on employment and social stability: namely, work-sharing, strengthened social-security 
system, and alternative economic spaces existing outside the market economy (Latouche 
2009). (…) Furthermore, the link between well-being and access to wage labor in the for-
mal economy can be weakened by improved access to non-monetized goods and services. 
/ ere are various social innovations in this domain, including urban food gardens for own 
consumption, time-banks where participants exchange services on the basis of their labor 
time, and co-housing projects where participants co-invest “sweat-equity” in house reha-
bilitation (Oarlsson 2008; NEF 2009). (van den Bergh and Kallis 2012: 912-913)
On the basis of the framework laid out above we may conclude that institutional innova-
tions for a new economy should not be simple ' xes of the current economic system, since 
they should change its very foundations. Rather then advocating a speci' c set of institutional 
innovations we have presented some policy options that should be further elaborated else-
where, bearing in mind the socio-economic and ecological foundations of our societies.
Tomislav Tomašević
Group22, Zagreb
Sustainable Cities: We in Cities That Need to Change
For the ' rst time in human history there are more people living in complex, dense, predomi-
nantly non-agricultural, human-built environments called cities than in rural areas. / is 
milestone in the history of our species was reached in 2008 (UNFPA 2007). / is is another 
piece of evidence to claims in Domazet’s article about unprecedented impact of humans on 
planet Earth that lead some scientists to call this “geological” era “Anthropocene”. Perhaps 
we are witnessing a new geological subdivision of Anthropocene era because Burde&  and 
Rode (2010) announced that the “Urban age” has began, with three quarters of the world 
population expected to live in cities by 2050. / is is the pinnacle of the increasing global 
urbanization process that started two centuries ago and is inextricably linked with process-
es of industrialisation, modernisation and development of capitalism. It is more and more 
clear that in order to address the global sustainability challenge of the current civilisation that 
Domazet addressed in the introductory article, sustainability or non-sustainability of cities as 
a dominant form of human habitation has to be addressed.
Before exploring whether cities are more a part of the problem or a part of the solu-
tion for global sustainability of the existing civilisation, the ' rst question already tabled is 
whether this civilisation is worth saving or even what essential component could it most 
readily be reduced to? Is it the current global economic system that reproduces social and 
environmental injustice around the world? Is it the o+ en imperialistic Western culture and 
science? Is it the international polity or community of national states unable to govern global 
and long-term threats to humanity and millions of other species? Encyclopaedia of Human 
Geography de' nes “civilisation” as “a process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic develop-
ment in which people leave a state of savagery and progress through a hierarchy from low 
cultures to high culture” (Warf 2006: 323). It goes on by saying how this idea is both criti-
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cised as a linear evolutionary process that justi' es domination of one group of people over 
the other but also as a negative process that distances people from nature, thus making the 
“lower cultures” ideal civilisations. / is paper follows the position that global civilisation 
as the global society should indeed be sustained not because it is the best possible world 
which is worth saving per se, but because the opting for the unsustainable path of material 
consumption might eventually lead to the global society regressing to a less desirable state. 
On the other hand transforming social structures to overcome both material limitations and 
reproduction of social inequalities might allow global society to advance8 towards universal 
human emancipation. / is paper takes the position that the civilisation did advance despite 
all of its imperfections and that it could both regress or advance further. It also argues against 
regressing to “traditional”, “primitive” societies or “lower cultures” as a path towards greater 
environmental sustainability. / e la& er is welcomed by those who believe that the pre-mod-
ern societies lived in harmony with nature, named “ecological noble savage” myth in the lit-
erature (Redford 1990). Etymologically, “civilisation” is closely related to “city” while Bagby 
de' nes “civilisation” as a “culture in which we can ' nd cities” (1959: 162). / ese conceptual 
assumptions have to be resolved before answering whether cities are a problem or a solution 
for the environmental, social and economic sustainability of the global civilisation. 
When one considers the environmental aspect of the urban sustainability challenge 
the environmentalist movement was from the outset sceptical of industrialisation and its 
by-product urbanisation, so there is an ongoing debate whether cities are a problem or a 
solution for the global environmental sustainability. At one side of the debate are the more 
modernist approaches like “smart cities” (Seisdedos 2012), which see cities as a solution 
for environmental sustainability and these are mostly based on eco-e0  ciency paradigm ac-
cording to which high density of urban form allows for a more e0  cient transport, industrial 
production and other urban systems assisted by sophisticated technology and social intel-
ligent design. Of course it is not the same when one talks of, for example, typical American 
city or a typical European city – an urban sprawl or a compact city. It is true that cities can 
signi' cantly reduce human habitat footprint, illustrated in abstraction by imagining a single 
world city. Were we to put the current total world population into a single city that would 
have the population density of Paris, the surface of that city would be similar to the surface of 
Finland.9 Unfortunately, habitat footprint of cities alone does not equal their overall ecologi-
cal footprint, as materials and energy that are consumed by the cities require a much bigger 
land surface area than the area on which they are built. / e assumption of eco-e0  cient cities 
does not only mean that cities are improving global sustainability, but that large cities can 
leverage more e0  ciency per capita so that they could contribute to the global sustainability 
more than smaller cities. 
However, a recent study (Oliveira et al. 2014) has shown how large cities, despite econ-
omy of scale which increases e0  ciency, have proportionally bigger carbon footprints than 
small cities. How is it possible that larger cities despite of improved e0  ciency in transport 
and other systems still produce more CO2 emissions per capita than smaller cities? / ey are 
simply more productive, eventually in the material sense, meaning that their citizens have 
bigger incomes per capita and consume more. / is shows that addressing only the e)  ciency 
of cities without addressing the su)  ciency or material and energy consumption by cities will 
8 Preferring the term “to advance” rather than “to progress” as the la& er is loaded and conected with the modernisation theory and 
the Western concepts of progress as the linear deterministic development that backward societies have to pass. 
9 With the data at the time of writing the calculation goes as following: total world population (7.170.000.000 people) divided 
by population density of Paris (21.289 people/km2) the surface of the world city (336.793 km2) is similar to surface of Finland 
(337.030 km2).
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eventually be insu)  cient in terms of achieving urban sustainability. Cities are pursuing eco-
nomic growth at all costs which is necessarily generating consumption growth so without 
some de-growth or anti-growth restructuring, e0  ciency and technological innovations will 
not be enough for achieving urban environmental sustainability. 
At the other side of the debate are the more post-modernist environmentalist approaches 
to cities which see them as a problem for environmental sustainability because they inher-
ently lead to consumerism, alienation from nature and social atomism. Instead of cities these 
environmentalists advocate ecovillages where only the “real” human material needs would be 
met with low technology through subsistence farming and cra+ s while sense of community 
would be re-invented (Kasper 2008). / is approach is also shared by the movement of Tran-
sition Towns led by Rob Hopkins (2008) who established the ' rst ecovillage in Ireland. / e 
Transition Towns is movement aiming, mostly in small towns, to reduce carbon footprint, 
fossil fuel use and vulnerability to global ' nancial * ows through localisation of economy and 
building of community. / ese smaller and more traditional physical forms of human se& le-
ments would be without bene' ts of economy of scale and without sophisticated division 
of labour, hence less e)  cient, but would be more (self-)su)  cient by satisfying only the basic 
material human needs. / ere is however a question of whether the world of soon to be 9 bil-
lion people can a) ord such de-industrialisation, de-modernisation and de-coordination if it 
wants to meet even the most basic needs of all these people. 
/ e ecovillages and ecotowns approach is following a speci' c environmentalist frame-
work called “small is beautiful” (Schumacher 1993), but sometimes small is not technologi-
cally optimal. For example, in the domain of: of energy conversion, which Domazet stresses 
as the key compoenent of developmentalist project in the introductory article, the case of 
energy e0  ciency of biomass power plants shows that bigger power plants can turn signi' -
cantly higher percentage of the thermal energy from biomass into electricity than the smaller 
power plants (Austin 2008). If “we need to change” as Domazet claims then this paper argues 
that “we need to transform cities” by using a combination of these approaches i.e. by tackling 
both urban eco-e0  ciency and eco-su0  ciency. Cities could be a part of the solution for global 
environmental sustainability, but only if the social structures and governance mechanisms 
of cities are changed to stop the growth of meaningless consumption, and simultaneously 
increase the e0  ciency resource use. / e concept of commons might ' ll-in this gap as it could 
at the same time addresses the issue of su0  ciency and the issue of e0  ciency by bringing the 
social organisation of eco-villages into urban physical form on a large scale. For example ur-
ban community gardens are more e0  cient in use of natural resources, as the community uses 
a single piece of land, rather than individuals in their private allotments; collective produc-
tion and consumption builds social capital and sense of community; there is a fair access to 
the food produced,not only within one particular urban community but through trade and 
redistribution with other community gardens within one city. 
/ e social aspect of the urbanisation is linked to debate on modernisation process which 
through technological and scienti' c advancements transforms rural, traditional society into 
urban, modern society. One part of the environmentalist and other social movements con-
siders modernisation as a negative process because the traditionalist rural culture of com-
munity and cooperation is transformed into a modernist culture of individualism and com-
petition. / e other part considers modernisation as a positive social processes which will 
dismantle traditional communities and social relations based on kinship, as they were usually 
linked with oppressive social forms like patriarchy. It was already stressed in this paper that 
regression to traditional pre-modern society as archetypes of ecological sustainability will 
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not be argued for, for such regression could mean more oppression and less identity free-
doms. How then can we reconcile individual freedoms and identities on the one hand and 
collective care and sense of community on the other? Iris Marion Young’s (1990) answer to 
this lies again in a city, in an urban social life. Young ' nds city as a perfect model in which 
diversity meets community, where parochialism is disabled and where di) erent identities 
can coexist by maintaining the social capital, solidarity and tolerance. Small communities are 
creating social moral pressure for an individual to ' t-in, while large cities give on one hand 
anonymity as precondition for individual freedom while in the same time direct experience 
of belonging to a large community or communities.
/ e economic aspect of urbanisation and urban sustainability is inextricably linked to 
the development of capitalism. Domazet argues that a technological ' x will not solve the 
environmental sustainability problem, but a “spatial ' x” or global urbanisation did however 
solve the problem of sustainability of the capitalist form of developmentalist project (Har-
vey 2001). Its global urbanisation on one side creates spatial inequalities at the global level 
and economic, and therefore social and political, inequalities within cities (Smith 2010). 
Neoliberal urbanisation in advanced capitalism both produces social inequalities and con-
sumes ever-growing quantities of space/resources in order to sustain the capitalist system. 
/ is makes the neoliberal urbanisation one of the main contributors to the combination re-
ferred to by Domazet that leads to a total collapse of the civilisation. Changing how cities are 
reproduced is therefore linked with changing urban economic systems i.e. social structures 
of production, distribution and consumption. If the free-market economy creates perverse 
distribution outcomes the question remains how then to ensure the e0  cient use of natural 
resources. / e state mechanisms of economic governance have historically been proven as 
too slow and ine0  cient so commons governance and economic democratisation might be 
the right way. In order to ensure e0  cient governance of resources, social innovations should 
be followed by the technological innovations and here the same study (Oliveira et al. 2014) 
shows that large cities create more technological innovations measured as patents per capita 
compared to smaller cities, possibly because of high dynamics and exchange of large number 
of people and their ideas. Empirical data of Elinor Ostrom (1990) showed many examples 
of successful community governance of natural and other resources but these communities 
have never been bigger than several thousands of people. If a sustainable city will be a “com-
mon city”, this would mean tens of thousands of commons-based governance systems mak-
ing a highly complex overall governance structure so that these systems are able to mutually 
coordinate and negotiate. However, it seems that the climate crisis is on the way and systems 
theory indicates that complex adaptive systems can adapt to their changing environment in 
order to sustain themseleves.
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Toward a Critique of the Political Economy of Climate Change 
beyond the Nature/Culture Binary: An Anthropologist’s Meditation 
/ e philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. / e point, however, is to 
change it. (Karl Marx, ' eses on Feuerbach, 1998: 571)
You want to save the elephants in Kenya’s parks by having them graze separately from cows? 
Excellent, but how are you going to get an opinion from the Masai who have been cut o)  
from the cows, and from the cows deprived of elephants who clear the brush for them, and 
also from the elephants deprived of the Masai and the cows? (Bruno Latour 2004: 170)
From a certain vantage, anthropology might appear to be a peculiar disciplinary platform 
from which to launch a critique of the global political economy of climate change. According 
to the familiar taxonomy of the social sciences, anthropology is typically cast as obdurately 
particularistic, concerned with idiographic description rather than nomothetic explanation 
(cf. Wallerstein et. al. 1996). My contention in this brief essay, however, is that anthropology 
has a crucial, indeed central role to play in interpreting the dilemmas of climate change and 
forging strategies by which to alleviate its depredations. Anthropology’s potential contribu-
tion to addressing the challenge of climate change stems from the conceptual underpinnings 
of the discipline: more so than any other human science, anthropology has grappled ' ercely 
and continuously with the problematic relationship between “nature” and “culture.” In recent 
decades, anthropologists have rejected the earlier, essentialist distinction between “nature” 
and “culture” in favor of a more nuanced, practice-based holism, which views “nature” and 
“culture” as mutual concepts that necessarily mediate and condition each other. / is revi-
sionist perspective surely holds key lessons for the debate over climate change. Rather than 
viewing climate change as a series of “cultural” e) ects on “nature”—a perspective that prob-
lematically severs human action from “nature” itself—I argue for a new narrative of climate 
change, one that locates the political economy of neoliberal capitalism as its central object 
of critique. In doing so, I take up Mladen Domazet’s clarion call to “bring to human under-
standing the processes unfolding on non-human scales…in emancipatory fashion in order to 
degrow but not destroy the civilizational accomplishments to date” (2014: 14).
Early 20th century anthropology, especially as practiced and propagated by Columbia 
University professor Franz Boas and his students in North America, staked its disciplinary 
legitimacy on the threshold between the domains of nature and culture (Boas 1989). For 
Boas and his disciples, culture, the locus of uniquely human traits and behavior, began pre-
cisely where nature ended—as the historian of anthropology George Stocking (1982) has 
demonstrated, Boas’ incipient “cultural” anthropology was decisive in overcoming the evo-
lutionary and racialist biases of 19th century anthropology. A+ er Boas, biological anthropol-
ogy—rooted in the study of human beings as natural organisms and still preoccupied with 
evolutionary concerns—and cultural anthropology—focused on human beings as, ' rst and 
foremost, social and cultural actors—fundamentally parted ways. American anthropology 
throughout the mid-20th century remained rooted in the culture concept, as exempli' ed by 
the oeuvre of Cli) ord Geertz (1977); across the Atlantic, British ethnographers inspired by 
functionalist Durkheimian sociology drew an equally rigid distinction between nature and 
social structure (e.g. Radcli) e-Brown 1965). 
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Within anthropology, the rigid dualisms of nature/culture and nature/society only be-
gan to erode with the advent of structuralism and the Copernican Revolution in anthro-
pological thought spurred by the work of Claude Levi-Strauss. Levi-Strauss famously inau-
gurated a critique of the distinction between scienti' c reason and other modes of human 
reasoning: “/ e scientist never carries on a dialogue with nature pure and simple but rather 
with a particular relationship between nature and culture de' nable in terms of his particular 
period and civilization and the material means at his disposal” (1966: 19). From the vantage 
of structuralism (and perforce post-structuralism), nature is no longer the absolute Other of 
culture; rather, the dichotomy of nature and culture is itself part of a broader, holistic pro-
cess of meaning-making. From here, it is but a short distance to the arguments of Bruno 
Latour (1993), whose model of science and technology studies (STS) abandons not only 
the distinction between culture and nature, but those between humans and non-humans and 
subjects and objects as well.
A word of caution is in order here, as we have wandered onto potentially thin conceptual 
and political ice. I have adduced this brief, partial history of anthropological speculation on 
the nature/culture dichotomy in order to expose some of the treacherous pitfalls in theoriz-
ing climate change. In particular, two pitfalls, a Scylla and a Charybdis, threaten our analysis 
and our political ambition: on the one hand, an anachronistic, unrepentant essentialism that 
rei' es both nature and culture, thereby establishing the unique privilege of scienti' c reason, 
and, on the other, a caricatured postmodern relativism that indiscriminately destabilizes the 
bases of all knowledge, scienti' c or otherwise, and thereby renders political action impos-
sible. / e ' rst pitfall—simplistic essentialism—has deleterious consequences beyond the 
double rei' cation of nature and culture. Most importantly in this context, the nature/culture 
binary polices the ' rewall between the “natural” and “social” sciences and renders the argu-
ments of the each set of disciplines mute and impotent to the other. As Domazet cogently 
argues, such academic parochialism is detrimental to recognition “of our species’ straddling 
of processes of vastly di) erent scales ordinarily relegated to separate disciplines of discourse” 
(2014: 7). Only by overcoming the rigid separation between “natural” and “social” sciences 
can we hope “to ' nd a voice that speaks from this straddling perspective” (ibid.). Such a 
“straddling perspective” is also crucial to avoiding the second pitfall, that of nihilistic relativ-
ism. / e integrative, “straddling perspective” that Domazet advocates necessarily takes us 
beyond Latour’s deconstruction of scienti' c knowledge, which has frequently been accused 
of aiding and abe& ing climate change skeptics and other politically reactionary actors (Sokal 
1996; see also Demeri&  2006). In the remainder of this essay, I hope to contribute to just 
this sort of “straddling perspective” and the struggle against epistemological nihilism in rela-
tion to climate change by destabilizing the nature/culture binary with a third term (which, I 
should note, Domazet also interrogates): neoliberal capitalism.
 Capitalism demands our critical scrutiny precisely because, as a political economy, it is 
blithely indi) erent to the nature/culture dichotomy. As Marx and Engels’ famous metaphor 
established long ago, within the regime of capitalist commodi' cation “all that is solid melts 
into air” (1948: 16)—whether the solidities in question here are “natural” or “cultural” is 
inconsequential. Arturo Escobar, an anthropologist of political ecology, has reiterated the 
urgency of this fundamental Marxian point more recently: “No longer is nature de' ned and 
treated as an external, exploitable domain. / rough a new process of capitalization…previ-
ously ‘uncapitalized’ aspects of society and nature become internal to capital” (1995: 199). 
In a curious sense, capitalism succeeds pragmatically where social science has failed theo-
MLADEN DOMAZET. We Need to Change 59
retically: It resolves the nature/culture binary by voraciously absorbing and commodifying 
“nature” and “culture” both. 
What are the political consequences of erecting a critique of climate change on an inter-
rogation of neoliberal capitalism, rather than on the nature/culture split? Most immediately, 
this focus on capitalism recenters environmentalism and green activism as commitments to 
social justice, rather than “merely natural” engagements (cf. Butler 1997). In other words, 
the critique of climate change is as much about human subjects and the inegalitarian rela-
tionships that maintain among them as it is about the “natural” world. And the reverse is 
also true: social justice is not merely a ma& er of human inequalities. In the era of neoliberal 
capital, the commitment to social justice necessarily spans the problematic divide between 
natural and cultural, human and non-human worlds. 
Even as we forward this reappraisal of the relationship between capitalism and climate 
change, however, we must also take care not to substitute one rei' cation for another. Capital-
ism, especially in its neoliberal iteration, is no more of an essence than “nature” or “culture”. 
Consequently, resistance to the e) ects of neoliberal capitalism—climatic or otherwise—
must necessarily be decentered and multiform as well. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(2001) remind us, the global “multitude” of the 21st century is not the proletariat of the 19th 
century. Of course, this is not to deny the urgent need for a global political reorientation, 
based ' rmly on “thinking for the 22nd century,” in the struggle against climate change, as 
Domazet (this volume) so passionately argues. It is simply to acknowledge that this process 
of resistance and reorientation will not, and cannot, be identical in all of its speci' c contexts. 
Nor is this cause for pessimism. As the anthropologist and environmentalist Anna Tsing 
(2005) has persuasively argued, “friction” among contexts and levels of political activism is 
inevitable in the age of dense, multidimensional interconnection that we dub globalization. 
Rather than despair over this ineradicable friction, the global movement to combat climate 
change must recognize and draw strength from it.
By way of a conclusion, I want to return brie* y to the two quotations with which I framed 
this essay, from Marx and Latour, respectively. Together, they function as coordinating sign-
posts for my argument and aspiration. Following Marx—the paradigmatic activist intellec-
tual—we must emphasize that scholarly speculation divorced from political action is li& le 
more than a cart without a horse. To interpret the world of climate change without changing it 
is to perpetuate the social and ecological injustices of this world. From Latour, on the other 
hand, we learn a cautionary lesson. Even as we struggle to link our interpretation of climate 
change to pragmatic political action, we must remain a& entive to the frictions that our politi-
cal project will inevitably provoke and involve. All vested commitments are not compatible; 
one cannot render the interests of the elephants, the cows, and the Masai entirely commen-
surate. / e struggle against climate change can only achieve global traction by acknowledg-
ing and addressing these myriad frictions. And it is at this juncture that anthropology, with 
its continued focus on the particularities of contexts, can seize its role in combating climate 
change. While climate scientists and political economists are key to mapping the contours 
and predicting the consequences of climate change on a global level, anthropologists are ide-
ally located to trace and rectify the frictions that the political project of reversing climate 
change will necessarily entail.
In this brief meditation, I have endeavored to make a small contribution to this project 
of overcoming friction by exploring the anthropological legacy of the nature/culture binary 
and its relationship to the climate change debate. Taking inspiration from Domazet’s essay, 
I have argued that rejection of the essentialist nature/culture binary and a concomitant fo-
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cus on issues of neoliberal capitalism and social justice is imperative to the advancement of 
the political struggle against climate change. My hope is that these interpretations provoked 
some friction in their own right—friction is, a+ er all, a source of heat and energy, and a spur 
to action. And the prospect of this action—to change the world of climate change—is what 
unites our various interventions in this forum, and, hopefully, in fora yet to come.
Karin Doolan 
Group 22, Zagreb 
Climate Change, Social Injustice and the Pathology of Life 
in Post-industrial Capitalism 
/ e tone of Domazet’s (this volume) piece is appropriately one of urgency. “We live in ex-
traordinary times”, he writes, marked by capitalism’s insatiable and detrimental urge for 
growth, related global environmental change and deepening social inequalities. He draws 
on expert sources warning us that hoping for a technological breakthrough that will solve 
the climate predicament is naïve, and instead urges us to embrace a sustainable degrowth 
project. My aim in this response to Domazet (this volume) is three-fold: to take a slightly 
closer look at an existing theme in his essay, the social injustice aspects of climate change, 
and to add to his piece by, on the one hand, furthering his critique of capitalism from the per-
spective of literature on the a) ective consequences of life in a consumer society and, on the 
other, by touching upon personal biases that favour the status quo in terms of environmental 
action. By doing so I wish to contribute to what I see as his critical project of evaluating “the 
established way of organizing society” against “other possible ways, ways which are held to 
o) er be& er chances for alleviating man’s struggle for existence” (Marcuse 1991 [1964]: 42) 
(though it would be appropriate to exchange Marcuse’s phrase “man’s struggle for existence” 
with “the planet’s struggle for existence” in the climate change context). 
Barker, Scrieciu and Taylor (2008), characterise climate change as “inherently inequi-
table and therefore unjust”, because it targets “systematically and mercilessly the vulnera-
ble, the poor and the extremely poor” (2008: 318). / e social justice dimension of climate 
change is discussed in the literature as a supra-national and national, inter- and intra-gener-
ational issue. Preston et al. (2014) conclude in a recent study that theoretical literature on 
climate justice has tended to focus on the unequal distribution of responsibility for carbon 
emissions between nations, i.e. North/South or post-industrial/developing. Although the 
authors acknowledge the importance of drawing a& ention to this supra-national dimension 
of climate justice, they also spell out its national dimension: disadvantaged groups contribute 
least to causing climate change yet are likely to be most negatively impacted by it; they pay, 
as a proportion of their income, the most towards the implementation of certain policy re-
sponses yet bene' t least from them; and they are less able to participate in decision-making 
around policy responses. According to Preston et al. (2014), disadvantaged groups include 
older people, people on low incomes and, overlapping with the low income group, tenants. 
Drawing on the example of * oods, the authors point out that recovering a+ er a * ood can be 
more di0  cult for people in poverty due to insu0  cient insurance or no insurance, the cost 
of temporary housing, transport costs related to relocation and lower access to credit. / ey 
call for national policy related to climate change to take more account of social inequalities, 
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expressing concern over the consequences of, for example, a risk-based market approach to 
* ood insurance (insurance premiums proportionate to the individual household’s level of 
risk) as opposed to an approach grounded in solidarity (those of lower risk support those 
at higher risk). Recent severe * ooding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia (May 
2014) brings the importance of such thinking close to home. 
An important, related issue is the interrelationship between economic growth, the en-
vironment and social justice. As Muraca (2012) points out, there is a split between those 
who see economic growth as a condition for distributive justice and defend its impact on 
the environment and those who see it as a threat to justice and the environment. For the for-
mer, economic growth increases the total amount of goods to be distributed which enhances 
overall standard of living, fosters social mobility, and boosts government revenues for social 
services thus improving the social welfare system. According to this argument, continuous 
growth is necessary for employment and spurs investment into technologies for coping with 
environmental problems. Domazet (this volume) labels this as “the imperative of growth 
cloaked as promise of emancipation” and refers to capitalism’s growth imperative as a “harm-
ful mechanism which feeds o)  increasing inequalities”. 
Muraca’s (2012) degrowth critique against pro-growth claims is persuasive: the “trick-
le-down e) ect” does not hold – without redistribution growth leads to an increasing gap 
between rich and poor, and there is a tight correlation between GDP growth and the de-
struction of the natural environment, including the increasing need for new resources lead-
ing to geopolitical forms of domination, such as production of biomass for the Global North 
or neo-colonialist water pollution and land grabs. Muraca (2012) goes on to question the 
growth imperative not only from the perspective of distributive justice and the environment 
but also in relation to our a) ective selves. As she points out, there is a negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and subjectively perceived happiness.
/ e a) ective dimensions of life in capitalism have been addressed by many authors. 
What they have in common is a diagnosis of late capitalism and consumer culture as det-
rimental to wellbeing. We are harming the planet with consumption that harms us above 
and beyond Martinez-Alier’s social justice argument that excessive consumption by the rich 
and middle-class people is “not only a menace for other species and for future generations 
of humans…it deprives poor people a fair share of resources and environmental space now” 
(2012: 62). Fromm (1956) uses the concept of “alienation” to describe the social charac-
ter of Western “modern personality”, people estranged from themselves who acquire just to 
have, satis' ed with useless possession. Salecl writes about late capitalist ideology as increas-
ing people’s anxiety with its insistence on self-making and self-ful' lment, concluding that 
“it looks as if free consumers end up consuming themselves” (2008: 2340). And according 
to Ilouz, consumption is based “almost exclusively on the ideology of personal well-being 
and self-satisfaction…the market encourages consumer choices based on the cultivation of 
a hyper-individualist identity” (2009: 386). In other words, a sense of self-worth in capital-
ism is cultivated on individualistic terms rather than through notions of solidarity, empathy 
and recognition of interdependence that for Preston et al. “sit at the heart of cosmopolitan 
notions of climate justice” (2014: 21). 
Domazet (this volume) seems to hope for a rational response to climate change: he urges 
us to “make a deep-rooted switch to sustainability using our collective knowledge” and main-
tains that a “reliance on the extensive knowledge of natural and social historical processes 
can help make the formerly localised alternatives bene' t the global population”. Salecl, how-
ever, focuses on emotional responses to alarming ecological problems: “we are behaving as 
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if nothing really has to change” (2012: 2280). Writing from a social psychology perspective, 
authors such as Johnson and Levin warn us that we are shaped by various biases which work 
against rational responses to climate change. Sensory biases direct us to avoiding reactions 
related to threats outside our direct realm of experience: “/ e machinery of the brain does 
not fully react to something until we detect it in the * esh” ( Johnson and Levin 2009: 1595). 
Psychological biases include positive illusion (overcon' dence about vulnerability to risk), 
cognitive dissonance (con* icting information made to ' t preferred beliefs), fundamental at-
tribution error (a& ributing one’s own behaviour to situational constraints), prospect theory 
(“gambling on doing nothing in the hope that things will not be as bad as all that”) and in-
group/out-group bias (blaming the causes and consequences of climate change on others) 
(ibid.: 1598). As the authors note, all of these biases lead people to downplay the danger of 
environmental change and their contribution to it. Apart from these individual-level biases, 
Johnson and Levin (2009) also identify organizational and political biases as thwarting en-
vironmental action. / ey describe organisations as bureaucratically inert, marked by vested 
interests, turf wars over budgets and competition for promotions which all lead to a focus 
on the past and present rather than the environment’s future. In terms of political bias, the 
authors write: “As long as the threat is at least four years away, or can be blamed on extrane-
ous causes or opposing political parties, other concerns are likely to take precedence” (ibid.: 
1599). For Johnson and Levin, policy makers and environmentalists should look beyond 
the facts and ' gures of climate change and take note of our responses to these, somewhat 
pessimistically concluding that “radical change may only come a+ er people are woken up 
to the danger by enough – or big enough – disasters close to home” (ibid.: 1601). / is is, 
however, (mostly) looking at responses to climate change at the level of individuals, which is 
an insu0  cient explanation for why we are not witnessing more action against climate change. 
On a more macro level, Krugman (2014), for example, writes that it is di0  cult to act against 
climate change in a political-economic context which is against government intervention 
(“think about global warming from the point of view of someone who grew up taking Ayn 
Rand seriously, believing that the untrammelled pursuit of self-interest is always good and 
that the government is always the problem, never the solution”), and which is hostile to sci-
ence. 
/ is response emphasises the following points: climate change is an issue of social jus-
tice; the false needs created by our consumer society, as well as capitalism’s twisted agenda 
for us to consume more and compete more contribute to the planet’s deterioration; and bias-
es, vested interests, ideology and anti-intellectualism work against action on climate change. 
I would like to second Domazet’s (this volume) call for a sustainable degrowth project along 
the lines of Boillat, Gerber and Funes-Monzote (2012: 600): “an equitable and democratic 
transition to a smaller economy with less production and consumption. It is about reducing 
the energy and material * ows while still ful' lling basic and growing human needs such as 
food, health, education and housing”. We are, a+ er all, already witnessing “disasters close to 
home”.
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New Planetary Vulgate: The Case of Environmental Crisis
In recent years or perhaps decades the theme of excessiveness has become a hobbyhorse for 
political groups and civil society activists situated on di) erent parts of the le+ -liberal spec-
trum. Excessive exploitation of natural resources, excessive consumerism, excessive manag-
ers’ bonuses, excessive inequality and other forms of socially indecent behaviour have o+ en 
caused uproar in public debates, and yet there has been relatively li& le e) ort to investigate 
whether this excessiveness represents an aberration in the workings of contemporary capi-
talism or its constitutive feature. In this short response to Domazet’s (this volume) paper 
that seeks to set the groundwork for “the holistic understanding of the economic hopes and 
geophysical drivers behind the themes of green economy and de-growth”, I will focus only on 
points I ' nd somewhat contestable or in need of a di) erent articulation, leaving aside a vast 
area of common agreement. 
/ ere is, of course, nothing wrong in pointing out the excessiveness of capitalism, al-
though it is important to do it in a comprehensible and a historically informed manner. / e 
notion of “civilisation that humans have been developing for millennia” (Domazet, this vol-
ume), although it undoubtedly provides philosophical depth to the issue of limits to eco-
nomic growth, doesn’t do much to clarify the nature of the terrain on which the struggle 
over environmental issues is taking place. What kind of terrain is it? It is a contested terrain, 
marked by the continuous e) ort of the neoliberal forces to transform their market agenda 
into common sense and secure the implementation of market solutions to the environmental 
problems. / at means that the odds are stacked against well-intended but naïve a& empts to 
construct a politically unde' ned global subject that will act in interest of humanity as a whole.
/ ere are several reasons why this is so. On the ideological level, neoliberals and sup-
porters of the market solutions in general do not care about inequality. For them, inequality 
is, to paraphrase Gordon Gekko,10 good. Inequality works. Inequality clari' es, cuts through, 
and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. / e same justi' cation could be given 
for the other forms of economic and political excessiveness, excluding, of course, excessive 
government de' cits which must be reduced by any means necessary. Furthermore, neolib-
eral academics, public commentators and think-tanks are not afraid to simultaneously rely 
on scienti' c discourse and anti-intellectualism to support denialism about climate change 
and generate noise about the steps that need to be taken in order to avert the most devastat-
ing e) ects of environmental crisis. Domazet rightly points out that economic democracy, 
changes in social distribution of incomes, and “a culture coupling civilizational a& ainment 
with consumption behaviour” (this volume) are the necessary ingredients of sustainable 
development for the 21st century. However, these elements taken together are more or less 
irreconcilable with the entrepreneurial culture and the institutional se& ing developing both 
on the global and local level. It is enough to recall that the last ten years were literally wasted 
on the count of ludicrous a& empts to implement various carbon trading schemes, such as the 
EU ETS, that failed to reduce GHG emissions and have in fact acted as a subsidy vehicle for 
the polluters generating windfall pro' ts for the power companies across the EU (Ho) man 
2011). / e same entrepreneurial mystique can be observed in the European semi-periphery 
10 A character in Oliver Stone’s 1987 ' lm Wall Street.
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where common entrepreneurial activity is being elevated to the status of indispensable social 
hermeneutics, so much so that any public speci' cation of capitalist developmentalism as the 
driving force of the present environmental collapse is considered to be risky and ill-advised. 
/ e critique of capitalist developmentalism is acceptable in specialized journals, while the 
agenda in the real world appears to revolve around ' nding a way to incentivize the so-called 
business community not to participate in further destruction of our eco-system. 
It is not important, at this point, whether business community’s material interests are 
driving the dominant ideological framework or vice versa. By the time “new organization of 
knowledge able to interpret the complexity of di) erent scale of collapse drivers” (Domazet, 
this volume) is translated to ' t the new planetary vulgate (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001), 
rallying call to intellectual mobilisation becomes no more than a careless whisper. / is new 
vocabulary of employers, high-ranking civil servants, NGO-o0  cials ' lled with buzzwords 
such as * exibility, governance, employability, fragmentation, exclusion, new economy, green 
growth is the main tool as Bourdieu and Wacquant point out, of the two social actors which 
play a prominent role in market “mitigation” of the environmental crisis: 
One is the expert who, in the shadowy corridors of ministries or company headquarters, 
or in isolation of think-tanks, prepares highly technical documents, preferably couched in 
economic or mathematical language, used to justify policy choices made on decidedly non-
technical grounds…the other is communication consultant to the prince – a defector from 
the academic world entered in the service of the dominant, whose mission is to give an 
academic veneer to the political projects of the new state and business nobility. (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 2001: 5)
/ ese groups are in the business of knowledge production, but are generally not curious 
enough to examine how “both the individual experience and the grand historical narratives 
weave an important meaningful whole” which can help us to “understand something about 
our common future” (Domazet, this volume). / ey are, however, interested in depicting 
capitalism as a complex evolutionary system which works best if le+  alone. Moreover, they 
are particularly well trained in giving reasons why democracy is dangerous if it implies giving 
decision making capabilities to the ignorant masses. / us, one should pay a& ention to the 
content and manner in which the collision of market and nature in the new planetary vulgate 
proscribes democracy and collective action in dealing with social and economic aspects of 
the environmental crisis.
If “a global subject (we) has to be de' ned” as Domazet suggests, it will have to be a “we” 
which has not grown tired of honouring the political commitments of the le+ , nor is afraid to 
ask the di0  cult questions, such as those Wendy Brown (1999) posed in her critique of the 
le+  melancholy: 
What political hope can we nurture that does not falsely ground itself in the notion that 
“history is on our side” or that there is some inevitability of popular a& achment to whatever 
values we might develop as those of a new le+  vision? What kind of political and economic 
order can we imagine that is neither state-run nor utopian, neither repressive nor libertar-
ian, neither economically impoverished nor culturally gray? (Brown 1999: 27)
 It is questions like these that have to be taken on board if one wants to do more than simply 
address the apparent excessiveness of the capitalist production. In confronting the powers 
that be, the identi' cation of weak or contradictory points in the neoliberal agenda should 
go hand in hand with the development of emancipatory counter-narrative which will allow 
the le+  to circumvent the pitfalls generated by the academic community and the neoliberal 
think-tanks. 
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REPLY TO COMMENTS
Mladen Domazet
I am grateful to Danijela Dolenec, Vladimir Cvijanović, Tomislav Tomašević, Jeremy Walton, 
Karin Doolan and Mislav Žitko for their critical responses to the opening proposition and for 
a continuing debate that has always been at the heart of sustainability thinking as embodied 
within Group 22. / e debate is rooted in background re* exion of the transformative work 
each of them undertakes in our community, and is exemplary of the evolving sustainability 
thinking as interpreted and reinvented in the peripheral societies of Europe. / at is the ' rst 
thing that makes the discussion performed here for the sake of this journal’s addressees more 
than just le& ers arranged into academic re* ection of life; constituted as it might be of energy 
conversions, social structures utilising them and governance mechanisms supervising them. 
/ e other supra-textual spectre of this discussion is the illustration it provides of the di) er-
ent discourses, narratives, perspectives and, most importantly, wholesome worldviews as to 
what re* exive humanity ought to learn from its history and present position. / is includes 
a permanent reminder to keep questioning its interpretation of reality at the same time as 
utilising it to modify that reality. It is this la& er spectre of the discussion recorded here that I 
feel most drawn to re* ect on in response. 
I do not see the responses and comments above as disputes to be se& led by the last wom-
an/man standing, and could outright agree with expanding the opening piece with their ad-
ditions; which I take many of these texts’ opening paragraphs themselves a& est. / ey do, 
nonetheless, present corrections, additions, calls for clari' cations, proposals of consequen-
tial strategies to be further examined or calls for rede' nition of the conceptual tools applied 
to the problem. Some combine several of those aspects. Calls for the rede' nition of concep-
tual tools comprise perhaps the most substantial challenge to the proposals contained in 
my original article and illustrate the most important divide between the researchers-activists 
within the programme enacted in Group 22, and perhaps the green le+  in general. It is also 
the greatest intellectual challenge to a philosopher, one unaccustomed to ' nd application of 
his/her intellectual endeavour. Despite calling for historical urgency, I am therefore tempted 
to heed Walton’s invocation to ‘[intellectual] friction’ as prospect for action and continued 
debate, but the comments on comments o) ered here will have to remain sketchy, indications 
of thinking yet to come. 
But ' rst for some history, again. Invocation of (historically or geophysically) imminent 
collapse of civilisation undoubtedly has a Malthusian ring to it. / e historical Malthus is 
a much maligned ' gure revered as a prophet and berated as a developmental spoil-sport, 
‘the apostle of the rich’ (Shelley) and the sinner ‘against science’ (Marx) (cf. Shapin 2014). 
Whichever view you want to take on a historical ' gure (and take your pick of academic 
commentary every time a development crisis becomes apparent enough), Malthus’ legacy 
is a useful illustration of the vagaries of our discussion in the preceding pieces. Some of the 
scienti' c warnings of potential civilizational collapse have an explicit Malthusian underpin-
ning, for example Ehrlich was predicting a Malthusian sustenance collapse in 1970s, and the 
debates over whether scarcity is an indication of the ' nal exhaustion of margins or a spur to 
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miraculous reinvention of humanity (or just capitalism, cf. Tomašević, Doolan and Žitko’s 
contributions, this volume) continue into 21st century (Mayhew 2014). But a di) erent per-
spective on the historical legacy of Malthus is important here, one of choice of methodology 
for analysis of the developmentalist project we call civilisation. 
Malthus’ own description of the humanity-nature interaction is an example of a mecha-
nistic science, a constructive explanation11 of the processes of ‘social metabolism’, which in 
his view consists of elemental concepts of food, organisms and the fundamental laws govern-
ing their temporal evolution, organisms need food to survive and strive to reproduce. In his 
view food is a limited resource and the reproduction drive is inherently insatiable leading to 
a geometric progression in the size of the population and eventual scarcity of food. Whether 
the ontology thus posited is correct or not is not of interest here, but the method for an-
ticipation and possible rational in* uence on the future is. Given the mechanism, our actions 
concerning the future consist of unfolding the reel of mechanism’s operation and tinkering 
with its components to alter its ' nal states. When strategizing an action we conceptually 
begin with the certain hypothetical elements, the elementary entities in terms of which to 
construct mental models of the complex phenomena we expect to observe or avoid. My own 
analysis of the developmentalist project in terms of mechanisms of energy conversions, so-
cial structures that utilise them and the governance mechanisms that supervise them (in the 
opening piece) could be taken as following that approach. In that I am revealed as an incor-
rigible physicist following Einstein’s dictum that understanding a process ultimately means 
' nding a constructive theory12 that covers the process in question (Einstein 1954). 
I understand Dolenec, Cvijanović and Tomaševeić’s comments, among other insightful 
concepts, theories and strategies they bring to the table, to be working with a similar world-
view. / ey take the proposed or a similar mechanism and ask which of its components can 
be most e) ectively impacted on to modify/avoid the complex’s future collapse state. In that 
they are an example of a part of critical thought on the le+ , and vociferous within Group 22 
research and thinking, not quibbling with what the nature of a hammer or a sickle ought 
to be, but what can be done with each of them now, given “the urgency of the task at hand” 
(Dolenec, this volume). Dolenec explicitly advocates “making small practical proposals” 
whilst keeping an eye on the “Gargantuan task” ahead. In recognising capitalism’s inherent 
connection to growth and its inherent connection to inequality, whose own inherent con-
nection to unsustainability of the current development model and eventual collapse should 
be decoupled, she proposes a degrowth strategy whose ' rst step is a re-evaluation of what we 
actually measure as progress and civilisation. It is a way to achieve eventual energy conver-
sion changes required to alleviate catastrophic climate change through tinkering with social 
structure and governance mechanisms in terms most readily understandable to everyone: 
wellbeing and welfare. 
Vladimir Cvijanović, in a succinct presentation of one transformative (and potentially 
trans-disciplinary) school of economic thinking, takes the call for degrowth one step further, 
explaining how its implementation requires more than simply reversing the harmful GDP 
growth at any cost. / ere are echoes and parallels of his recognition of urgency to orientate 
the Régulation Approache’s detailed explanation of workings of the historically stable socio-
economic constellations on the woes of 21st century in Žitko’s calls to name the political 
orchestrators of the status quo and Walton’s requirements of the study of social dynamics 
to speed up the resultant explanatory model’s application. Yet, and I can only humbly agree, 
11 I have dealt with constructive and principle explanations in natural science, a popular paradigm of method, at length in Domazet 2012. 
12 Constructive, as opposed to a simpler and at times revolutionary principle theory (method) to be introduced below. 
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Cvijanović states that “institutional innovations for a new economy should not be simple 
' xes of the current economic system”, requiring an eventual substantive change in social 
structures and governance mechanisms adjacent to current energy conversion technology. 
Recognition of mechanism, operating on its components, but an aim for a fundamental over-
haul in the end. 
What might the substantive changes be like on the ground is well elaborated in 
Tomašević’s piece presenting a rei' cation of all three of civilisation’s essential elements in the 
modern city and the historic role of contemporary cities with regards culture and resource 
consumption. Technical notions of resource e0  ciency and economies of scale are here well 
illustrated in the complex phenomenon arising out human populations, individuals’ aspira-
tions and structures of social reproduction. I could not have foreseen a be& er instantiation of 
the adoption of the standpoint of a future collapse and subsequent entertaining of the (sup-
posedly) past counterfactual possibilities, which I characterised the “thinking for the 22nd 
century” by in the opening piece. And yet, like my own proposition, these could all be seen 
as resting on constructive metaphysics of future change. In that they could methodologically 
be likened to the view of ecological economics, with its energy-value materialist ontology 
and ‘nature’ as the ontological basis of value de' ned as ‘enjoyment of life’ (Burke&  2006); 
and Malthus’ essentialism of humanity-nature interaction through deterministic evolution. 
How right or wrong this might be is not the issue here. What is interesting is the vociferous 
critique they both a& ract from the Marxist analysis of the structures of capitalist ascription of 
value, as a ground for a di) erent response to entertaining the past counterfactual possibilities 
from the standpoint of 22nd century. 
If you are still reading, this is where our historical example comes to fruition. Malthus’ 
mechanistic evolution of increasing population into a situation ‘when the number of men sur-
pass their means of subsistence’ (cf. Shapin 2014) drew staunch opposition from the Marxist 
thinkers as both scienti' cally wrong and unduly pessimistic of the human transformative 
potential. Likewise, ecological economics, in Burke& ’s analysis, is criticised from a Marx-
ist (thus essentially radically critical of capitalism) perspective for giving undue ontological 
weight to capitalist forms of valuation (Burke&  2006). It is not the intentions of ecological 
economics, but its very explanatory ontology that is problematic from the perspective of 
Marxist le+ .13 Perhaps what we need, they might say, is a whole other explanatory approach, 
one based not on hypothesising what the mechanism behind nature-civilisation complex 
is, but on simple principles which provide unexceptionable generalizations of the desirable 
future outcomes. Not a game of counterfactual what-might-have-been, but a listing of the nec-
essary conditions or constraints on events that describe simply and self-evidently what the 
world must be like for the unwanted outcomes not to take place. Not the constructive ontol-
ogy of how collapse could be avoided, but an explanatory generalisation of the principles 
that constrain and de' ne the desired, non-collapse and civilisation-sustaining world. / is is 
a ' ery ‘friction’ that has the potential to give rise to the “voice that speaks from [a disciplinar-
ily] straddling perspective” (cf. Domazet, above). 
Whilst acknowledging that a Malthusian pessimism has hardly been historically positive-
ly falsi' ed, i.e. that it still provides a viable method and ontological framework today (barring 
class and ‘racial’ insensitivities), I take the liberty to read the remaining three responses in the 
line of criticism of such an explanatory and predictive method. In that they make a strong 
point, connect to a powerful historical precedent and provide a good illustration for the read-
13 / e same can’t be said of the Marxist criticism of Malthus, who was derided as the unapologetic reactionary speaking for “the 
exclusive interests of the existing ruling classes or sections of them” (Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, 2: 136-137). 
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er of the depth of the debate along the green-le+  political spectrum. Jeremy Walton warns of 
the dangers of “viewing climate change as a series of ‘cultural’ e) ects on ‘nature’”, redolent 
of the ontological separation of energy conversion technologies (which includes utilisation 
of living organisms) and social structures for its utilisation. He is nonetheless aware of the 
dangers of impotent yo-yoing between “simplistic [ontological] essentialism” and its u& er 
methodological negation, “a caricatured postmodern relativism” (Walton, this volume). 
I therefore take his call for focusing our critical scrutiny on “an interrogation of neoliberal 
capitalism” as an example of a paradigm methodological shi+  from entities to principles, a 
“decentred and multiform (…) resistance to the e) ects of neoliberal capitalism” as a frame-
work for global political reorientation in the 21st century, instead of seeking the modi' cations 
to some intellectually posited historical mechanism. 
Likewise, Karin Doolan’s invitation to complement the rational analysis of the climate 
change threat with “emotional responses to alarming ecological problems” (Doolan, this vol-
ume) could also be taken as an invitation to understand the change required in 21st century as 
paradigmatic demarcation of the space of action by the innately human a) ective responses to 
the “disasters close to home” (ibid.). Doolan calls for a recognition of the political-economic 
context and cultural hostility to science not as an object of academic research, but a direct ob-
stacle to action against climate change, and its a& endant civilizational collapse. We know the 
kind of transition we require, the intellectual analysis should give us the tools to achieve it, 
not furnish a ' ner level of descriptive detail. / e most vociferous agreement with the analysis 
of ills, but from wholeheartedly di) erent paradigm, is exempli' ed by Mislav Žitko’s scathing 
criticism of a historically misinformed enumeration of the “excessiveness of capitalism” and 
invocation of a wholly di) erent “terrain on which the struggle over environmental issues is 
taking place”. If one wants to understand the change that the 21st century calls for in the open-
ing piece, then one must see it as a struggle against “neoliberal forces” and not an intellectual 
search for a “politically unde' ned” disinterested development mechanism, he says (Žitko, 
this volume). Name the opponent to be overcome (“the powers that be”), name the “political 
and economic order” you want to see in 22nd century (Žitko, this volume), and start pu& ing 
it in place as soon as possible. With that, his comment concludes the snapshot of discus-
sion and the recorded discursive edi' ce of an ongoing debate for a red and green political 
economy under the pressure of wholescale, material and measurable collapse of civilisation. 
With deep gratitude to all commentators and apologies for inadvertently erroneous 
framing of their positions within a sea of worthy analyses and strategies addressing 21st cen-
tury limits to growth, I want to stress that di) erences in explanatory paradigms are neither 
paralysing nor futile in science and explanation in general. As a historical example of Mal-
thusianism shows, absolute collapse of British population has not occurred in 1825, nor of 
global population in 2000; but Malthusian growth concerns are every bit as vivid in the cli-
mate threat and mathematical carrying capacity modelling today, and the developmentalist 
project has engendered numerous instances of mini-collapses, painful denial of scarce re-
sources to some and bountiful smuggling of externalities wherever possible. A philosophical 
rejoinder from an explanatory ontology straddling processes of vastly di) erent scales might 
stress that the fundamental unit of a realist ontology is not the instantaneous state of a hy-
pothetical structure, but a generalised thing. / ings, as something we recognise as invariant 
through change, are ineliminable fundamentals of experience, and our understanding of the 
transformations to sustainability could be built on what we must maintain to make sense of 
the civilised, yet living, humanity as a common denominator of di) erent political strategies. 
In short, studying what we mean by progress, civilisation, reproduction and capitalism is 
neither an academic exercise in ‘le+  melancholy’ nor political lip-service to entrenched pow-
er-structures (Žitko, this volume). It is a necessary civilizational, cultural precondition of 
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cooperative meaningful action, a score that is as important for a melody as a taught string and 
a clean horn. It is the explanation that makes sense of the adventures to come, pace Gryphons 
admonitions to Alice to drop explanations for want of time and only provide a description 
of a sequence of events (Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland). Gryphon, a+ er all, 
is hasty, dismissive and overbearing character who doesn’t end well. Despite the, here largely 
unassailed, a) ective urgency of the present human geophysical and historical position, agree-
ment on the common denominator for the political struggle “to change the world of climate 
change” (Walton, this volume) is the ' rst step in choice of rational and irrational strategies 
to tackle it (both invariable traits of a humanity, de Sousa 2004). Read, decide for yourself, 
organise, cooperate, join us. 
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